Over the past two decades, Lebanon has faced numerous challenges that highlight a dysfunctional and stalled political system. The Taif Agreement of 1989, which introduced constitutional reforms to the consociational system and ended the civil war, remains only partially implemented. Whenever the President’s term ends, the Council of Deputies is often deadlocked for months, sometimes even years, unable to elect a successor due to differing interpretations of the Constitution regarding electoral procedures and majority requirements.
Hezbollah’s influence in the country has grown significantly, with the group now holding unilateral control over decisions of war and peace with Israel has become solely in his hands – an explicit violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty. This was evident in the wars Hezbollah initiated in 2006 and 2023, both of which wreaked havoc on Lebanon.
Corruption in the country reached alarming levels, culminating in the financial and economic collapse at the end of 2019 and the Beirut port explosion on August 5, 2020. Despite these devastating events, justice has yet to be served in either case.
Lebanon’s struggles, however, are not new. The country endured a brutal civil war between 1975 and 1990. Even after the war ended, Lebanon was under the occupation of the Syrian regime, which interfered in all decision-making, public appointments, and government formation. As a result, the Lebanese people did not govern their country autonomously from 1990 to 2005, and it remained unclear whether the consociational system was working effectively under the new constitutional amendments.
Many Lebanese believe that communitarianism is the root cause of the country’s ongoing crises and the impunity of those responsible of them. Among the critics, some, particularly the young people who participated in the 2019 protests, advocate for replacing the communitarian system with a pure majoritarian democracy. They envision a system where all citizens are equal under the law, and religious affiliation carries no political weight.
Others argue that federalism is the solution, contending that a majoritarian democracy cannot function effectively in a country as diverse as Lebanon, with its eighteen different religious communities. They believe that a unitary state fails to satisfy many communities, especially Christians, making federalism a more viable alternative. Despite this, the idea of federalism has not officially been adopted by any political party since the civil war. It remains primarily a cause championed by some Christian political activists.
Meanwhile, Christian political parties, particularly the Lebanese Forces and Kataeb, acknowledge the need for system reform, though the extent of the changes they would support remains uncertain. A radical overhaul of the system is seen as risky, potentially threatening the unique status of Lebanon, where Christians are proactive citizens and enjoy freedoms not found in many other Middle Eastern countries.
On the other hand, most Muslim political groups do not call for a change in the system, with the notable exception of the Amal party, which advocates for the cancellation of communitarianism. However, this call is often met with skepticism, as Amal is a Shiite party allied with Hezbollah. Critics question the sincerity of Amal’s position, noting that if the party were genuinely committed to ending communitarianism, it could start by reforming its own ranks and those of its closest ally.
To better understand potential solutions for Lebanon, it is important to examine some historical contexts and explore the theoretical insights of Arend Lijphart, who first developed the concept of consociationalism.
First, it is important to recognize that Lebanon’s consociational system has deep historical roots, dating back to the establishment of the Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate in 1861. However, the political coexistence and interaction between the Maronite and Druze communities can be traced even further back, to the Shehabi Emirate in the seventeenth century. This period is often regarded as the beginning of modern Lebanon within its current borders, as the Shehabi Emirate encompassed much of what is now the Lebanese Republic, although it was not always unified as a single province.
Communitarianism has been a defining feature of Lebanon’s history since the time of the Emirate. It was at the heart of the first major conflict that disrupted the Shehabi Emirate in 1841, when tensions between the Druze and the Maronite boiled over. This unrest led to a significant change in the system, as the Ottoman authorities responded by dividing the Emirate in 1843 into two distinct Qaim-Maqamate: one with a Druze majority and the other with a Maronite majority. This subdivision did little to resolve the underlying communitarian issues. In 1860, a full-blown civil war erupted between the Christians and the Druze, culminating in the massacre of many Christians. In response to this crisis, the Ottoman Empire, in agreement with France, Britain and Russia, reorganized the region under the Mutasarrifate system in 1861. This reorganization reduced the territory of the Emirate significantly, stripping it of key areas such as Beirut, Tripoli, and the Beqaa Valley.
Lebanon’s experience with the Double Qaim-Maqamate system is a historical example of an attempt to address communitarian tensions through a federal-like solution. However, this division ultimately led to further conflicts and massacres, rather than resolving the underlying issues. Similarly, the later Mutasarrifate system, which reduced Mount Lebanon to a smaller territory, initially brought some prosperity but eventually suffered greatly during World War I, particularly during the famine.
These historical examples suggest that solutions like federalism or territorial division may not necessarily resolve Lebanon’s communitarian challenges. Instead, history shows that the root of the problem may go beyond the specific structure of the political system. This aligns with Arend Lijphart’s observations on consociational democracies, where he argues that conflicts between subcultures cannot be resolved through traditional democratic processes like parliamentary opposition, bargaining, or elections, as these conflicts are often too explosive. Instead, he posits that successful consociational democracies must adhere to four key principles: a legal governmental coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality and minority veto rights. The first two principles – legal governmental coalition and segmental autonomy – are essential, while proportionality and minority veto rights are important additional safeguards.
In Lebanon, these four conditions are indeed present in the political system. Power is shared equally between the Muslims and the Christians, both in Parliament and the Council of Ministers, with constitutional customs ensuring that the President of the Republic is Maronite, the Speaker of Parliament Shiite, and the Prime Minister is Sunni. Segmental autonomy is evident in the personal status laws; each religious community has its own laws and courts for these matters. Proportionality and the right of veto are also integrated into the Constitution and are often applied by custom in the government’s decision-making processes on fundamental issues in many cases by the government.
However, Lijphart was acutely aware of the crucial role that elites play in a consociational system. He argues that the success of such a system hinge more on the actions and attitudes of the elites than on the legal framework itself. The elites must be capable of recognizing the dangers posed by a fragmented political culture and must possess a strong commitment to counteract any tendencies toward the disintegration of the system. They need to be able to communicate effectively across subcultural divides, transcending these divisions to address the needs of various groups. Lijphart also notes that excessive strain on the system could overwhelm it and render it ineffective.
Understanding the current issues in Lebanon requires a focus on the role of its elites. The critical question today is not merely about constitutional interpretations or amendments but about the priorities of these elites and their commitment to stabilizing and strengthening the system. When some elites prioritize their own agendas – such as armament, foreign interests, or personal gain – they often work to weaken rather than consolidate the system, pursuing their goals at the expense of national stability.
The problem in Lebanon is rooted in the behavior of certain elites, and it cannot be resolved by system changes alone. These elites may intentionally obstruct the system to reduce the state’s authority and expand their own influence. Thus, any solution must involve internal reforms within the communities themselves. As long as the populace supports corrupt elites, no sustainable solution will be achievable. To cultivate effective leaders, systemic changes should focus on fostering leadership qualities among the people, enhancing their discernment, encouraging proactive engagement, and holding leaders accountable. This approach will help generate a new generation of elites who are committed to improving the system rather than undermining it.
Vanessa Breidy is a lawyer, member of the Beirut Bar Association, she has a doctorate degree in Arabic and Islamic studies from PISAI, Rome.
Cover photo: A Lebanese demonstrator is pictured in Beirut’s Martyr Square during a gathering on Lebanon’s Independence Day on November 22, 2019. (Photo by ANWAR AMRO / AFP)
